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Authoritarian	Neoliberalism	in	Africa:	All	Pain,	No	Gain	
	
ABSTRACT	
As	a	region	of	the	world	capitalist	political	economy,	Africa	is	the	
epitome	 of	 neoliberalism	 as	 a	 universal	 project	 to	 remake	
societies	 in	 its	 image.	The	 realisation	of	neoliberal	programmes	
of	 change	 encountered	 a	 region	 already	 ensconced	 in	 state-
forms	 that	 were	 authoritarian,	 albeit	 very	 often	 weaker	 than	
their	 analogues	 in	 Latin	 America	 or	 Southern	 Europe.	 In	 these	
circumstances,	neoliberalism	both	reconstructed	and	relied	upon	
authoritarian	state	practice:	reassertions	of	law	and	order,	rising	
technocracy,	re-built	bureaucracies,	and	‘choiceless	democracy’.	
Reviewing	 these	 neoliberal	 authoritarian	 constructions,	 one	 is	
struck	 by	 how	 poorly	 they	 performed	 as	 vehicles	 for	 market-
based	 capitalist	 transformation.	 In	 a	 phrase,	 the	 pain	 of	
neoliberal	 adjustment	 was	 accompanied	 by	 no	 palliative	 of	
sustained	 economic	 ‘gain’.	 This	 conjuncture	 is	 pivotal	 to	 an	
understanding	of	moves	by	some	governing	elites	to	explore	and	
at	times	implement	non-neoliberal	development	strategies.	
	
Introduction	
This	article	argues	that	authoritarian	neoliberalism	in	Africa	is	a	failed	strategy	of	
capitalist	transformation.	Aspiring	to	combine	an	administrative	and	technocratic	
governance	with	economic	liberalism,	authoritarian	neoliberalism	has	not	generated	
a	sustained	process	of	accumulation,	investment,	and	sectoral	change	away	from	
low-productivity	economies.	As	such,	neoliberalism	combines	both	a	normatively	
troubling	mode	of	governance	with	a	useless	economic	model.	Conceptualising	
authoritarianism	as	a	state	form	historically	generated	by	the	absence	of	a	socially-
dominant	bourgeoisie,	we	pose	the	question	whether	the	neoliberal	project	
effectively	infuses	this	state	form	with	the	wherewithal	to	promote	capitalist	
development	which	is	its	fundamental	claim	to	legitimacy.	Finally,	we	identify	how	
the	neoliberal	project	is	currently	weakened	in	Africa,	and	that	African	governments	
and	intellectuals	are	constructing	possible	alternatives	to	it,	albeit	still	within	the	
authoritarian	mode	of	governance.	
	
Neoliberal	social	project,	authoritarian	state	
	
Neoliberalism	
It	is	now	well-recognised	that	the	term	neoliberalism	is	in	danger	of	losing	its	
identity,	or	at	least	having	successfully	developed	through	conceptual	diffusion	
rather	than	focus	(Venugopal	2015).	Beyond	its	signification	of	a	“critical”	approach	
to	the	free	market,	it	is	difficult	to	pin	down	a	conceptual	definition	that	is	workable	
between	writers	who	commonly	have	different	theoretical	concerns	and	
methodologies.	Neoliberalism	has	been	used	to	identify	a	reinvigorated	
neoclassical/laissez-faire	ideology	of	the	market	society	(Stedman	Jones	2012;	
Turner	2011);	to	focus	on	the	shift	in	the	political	economy	of	capitalism	towards	
finance	based	in	an	attacked	on	labour	and	regulation	(Crouch	2011;	Dumènil	&	Levy	
2004;	Harvey	2005);	to	express	concern	with	the	changes	in	state	form	that	involve	
technical	and	depoliticising	institutions	and	discourse	(Demmers	et	al.	2004);	to	
characterise	governmentalities	based	in	the	rationalities	of	individualism	and	
responsibility	(Joseph	2013;	Larner	2000;	Ong	2006);	to	criticise	a	wide	range	of	
actions	by	capital	and	international	financial	institutions	(Cammack	2002;	Owusu	
2003);	to	announce	new	global	regimes	(Gill	1995),	new	ideologies	of	‘common	
sense’,	new	social-psychologies,	and	affects	(Brown	2015).	It	is	also	the	case	that	
writers	have	been	wont	to	see	neoliberalism	in	recombinant,	“rolled	out”,	and	
“inclusive”	forms:	present	in	many	places	and	in	many	guises,	a	move	that	improves	
the	concept’s	ability	to	engage	with	diverse	social	realities	but	which	also	renders	
the	concept	even	less	distinct	(Ong	2007;	Peck	&	Tickell	2003;	Porter	&	Craig	2004).		
There	is,	of	course,	a	simple	core	premise	within	this	expansive	literature	which	is	
expressed	by	Giroux	as	well	as	anyone:	a	‘belief	that	the	market	should	be	the	
organizing	principle	for	all	political,	social,	and	economic	decisions’	(Giroux	2004:	xii).	
It	is	just	that	the	subsequent	analytical	and	methodological	move	that	this	definition	
suggests	is	radically	unfixed.	Thus,	it	is	important	to	set	out	as	clear	a	
conceptualisation	of	the	term	as	we	can	here	before	proceeding	any	further.	In	this	
article,	neoliberalism	is	understood	to	be	a	global	social	project	to	realise	an	
ideology	of	the	free	market	into	as	many	aspects	of	the	political	economy	as	possible	
(Harrison	2010;	Gill	&	Cutler	2014:	9).	It	is	based	on	the	core	neoclassical	tenet	that	
free	markets	are	socially-optimal,	efficient,	and	tend	towards	equilibrium	(Shaikh	
2005)	and	it	is	animated	by	a	desire	to	realise	this	particular	market	ontology	
principally	through	states.	As	such,	neoliberalism’s	drivers	are	practices	to	marketise	
all	aspects	of	social	life	and	to	fashion	states	into	institutions	to	enforce	this	
marketisation.		
Neoliberalism	as	a	social	project	is	realised	through	classes,	cadres,	and	epistemic	
communities	dedicated	to	the	universal	realisation	of	a	more	or	less	coherent	
neoliberal	world.	This	is	as	utopian	or	millenarian	a	project	as	any	in	modern	political	
ideology	(Clarke	2005:	51;	Comaroff	&	Comaroff	2000).	It	is	ambitious,	expansive,	
and	combative.	It	is	unrealised,	but	it	possesses	enough	faith,	evidence,	resource,	
power,	and	legitimacy	to	render	it	a	component	of	almost	every	political	institution	
in	the	world.	It	has	amply	demonstrated	its	tenacity	(Mirovski	2013;	Streeck	2017).	
The	social	project	of	neoliberalism	is	expansive;	it	is	about	the	creation	of	regulations,	
habits,	disciplines	and	incentives,	and	norms.	The	telos	of	these	practices	is	a	
universal	condition	in	which	neoliberalism	is	understood	as	a	natural	phenomenon,	
not	a	political	one.	
The	literature	on	neoliberalism	is	more	than	sufficiently	diverse	and	contentious	to	
expect	that	this	brief	definitional	standpoint	might	be	subjected	to	all	manner	to	
criticisms.	That	makes	our	definition	unexceptional.	The	framing	of	neoliberalism	as	
a	social	project	does	however,	allow	us	to	focus	on	the	empirical	and	material	nature	
of	neoliberalism.	It	allows	us	both	to	maintain	a	relatively	clear	sense	of	
neoliberalism’s	ideological	core	without	slipping	into	the	ideationalist	trap	in	which	
the	neoliberalism	has	its	own	agency.		
It	also	allows	us	to	accept	neoliberalism	as,	ab	initio,	a	‘dirty’	and	incomplete	
phenomenon	without	getting	tied	up	in	sometimes	overly-complex	discussions	
about	hybridity,	contextualisation,	and	contestation	(Ong	2006).	As	a		social	project,	
neoliberalism	is	intrinsically	and	constitutively	hybrid	and	compromised	by	all	
manner	of	socio-political	institutions	which	‘corrupt’	the	ideal,	economistic	or	
technically	pure	abstractions	that	might	be	used	to	theorise	neoliberalism	(Fine	
2015).		
	
Authoritarianism	
There	is	a	rough	and	stylised	way	of	seeing	authoritarianism	as	statist,	centralised	
and	undemocratic	political	governance.	Used	descriptively,	authoritarianism	is	
defined	by	the	removal	of	popular	accountability	or	participation	in	the	decisions	of	
the	state	and	a	substantial	centralisation	of	executive	power	in	a	bureaucracy.	It	
associates	itself	with	states	that	are	disposed	to	use	heavy	mixtures	of	bureaucratic	
fiat	and	coercion.	From	these	co-ordinates,	we	have	the	wherewithal	to	develop	a	
descriptive	categorisation	of	coercive	and	pervasive	bureaucratic	governance	and	to	
call	this	authoritarianism.	But,	from	a	Marxist	tradition	of	political	economy,	it	is	
difficult	to	discern	the	salient	ways	in	which	authoritarian		state	practices	relate	
specifically	to	the	social	relations	of	capitalism.	There	is	a	need	for	a	logic	of	
articulation	between	authoritarianism	and	neoliberalism,	a	means	to	generate	a	
conceptualisation	of	authoritarian	neoliberalism.	This	logic	needs	to	move	beyond	
the	recognition	that	all	capitalist	states	contain	‘moments’	or	tendencies	of	
authoritarian	practice	because	this	renders	the	coupling	of	authoritarianism	and	
neoliberalism	largely	descriptive.	
This	article	will	treat	authoritarianism	as	a	distinct	state	form	that	derives	from	
national	political	economies	in	which	there	is	no	universally-dominant	bourgeoisie.	
In	these	countries,	property	relations	are	not	near-universally	based	in	private	
property;	the	social	relations	of	labour	are	significantly	varied	and	not	based	on	a	
near-universal	proletarianisation;	the	capitalist	class	remains	heavily	dependent	on	
state	power	or	limited	in	its	social	domination;	and	processes	of	accumulation	are	
weak	and	halting.		
These	broad	conditions	prevail	throughout	Africa.	Land	tenure	is	sustained	through	
combinations	of	collective,	lineage,	and	freehold	forms	and	small	and	medium-sized	
businesses	typically	enjoy	formal	and	informal	entitlements	to	their	assets	and	
property.	African	capitalist	classes	remain	strongly	intertwined	with	the	factional	
dynamics	that	contest	access	to	state	power,	and	they	are	also	dominated	by	
international	capital	in	those	sectors	where	there	is	global	interest.	Class	relations	
are	commonly	interstitial:	combinations	of	wage	work,	trading,	agriculture,	frequent	
migration,	good	and	bad	years,	debt	and	credit,	legality	and	illegality.	People’s	
labour	is	organised	around	‘multiplex’	labour:	small-scale	farming,	entrepreneurship,	
wage	employment	(casual	and	formal,	temporary	and	permanent),	trading	and	craft	
production.	The	social	relations	of	labour	are	defined	by	complex	differentiations	
and	a	not	inconsiderable	contingency	in	which	sustained	and	large-scale	
employment	by	capital	is	absent.	And,	within	African	bourgeoisies,	accumulation	is	
defined	by	low-technology	and	low-productivity	forms	of	production	that	do	not	
generate	strong	processes	of	transformative	change.	
Authoritarianism	is	a	political	response	to	these	socio-economic	circumstances	that	
prevail	in	post-colonial	African	countries,	an	historically-specific	state	form	that	
coalesces	around	the	major-order	political	challenge	of	developing	a	strong	capitalist	
class	that	might	drive	a	process	of	accumulation	and	transformation.	And,	we	can	
see	this	authoritarian	state-form	within	a	global	historical	context.	
Nicos	Mouzelis’s	(1986)	and	Clive	Thomas’s	(1984)	conceptualisations	of	
authoritarianism	are	a	useful	starting	point	here.
1
	In	Mouzelis’s	analysis	of	post-
oligarchic	‘semi-peripheral’	states,	he	sets	out	a	nuanced	account	of	the	rise	of	
authoritarianism	in	southern	Europe	and	Latin	America	in	the	1920s.	
Authoritarianism	is	a	mode	of	governance	that	aims	to	deploy	centralised	and	
purposeful	state	power	to	promote	the	structural	transformation	of	the	economy	in	
situations	where	existing	classes	and	property	regimes	seem	unable	to	do	so	(1986	
pp.	184-196).
	
Thomas	analyses	‘peripheral’	states	in	similar	ways,	but	from	a	
Marxisant	dependency	perspective.	He	recognises	the	weakness	of	national	
bourgeoisies	and	the	absence	of	a	process	of	capitalist	development	and	relates	this	
to	a	state-form	in	which	capitalist	classes	and	the	state	develop	authoritarian	modes	
of	governance	to	shore	up	their	power	against	popular	discontent	(1984:	82-88).	
Thus,	in	both	analyses,	authoritarianism	is	a	mode	of	rule	based	in	a	particular	
historical	circumstance	which	can	be	shorthanded	as	capitalist	transition,	analogous	
to	the	general	patterns	of	Africa’s	post-colonial	condition.		
We	have	defined	neoliberalism	as	a	universal	social	project	of	marketization	and	
authoritarianism	as	a	specific	state-form	that	emerges	in	countries	in	which	the	
bourgeoisie	is	weak	and	capitalist	development	requires	centralised	and	forcible	
state	action.	We	need	now	to	connect	these	two	together	in	order	to	set	out	a	
workable	definition	of	authoritarian	neoliberalism.	This	is	not	entirely	
straightforward.	Authoritarianism,	in	our	conceptualisation,	is	not	simply	those	
facets	and	tendencies	of	states	to	act	undemocratically	by	deploying	bureaucratic	
and	police	compulsion	to	aspects	of	social	life.	In	this	more	descriptive	rendering,	all	
states	are	in	some	degree	authoritarian.	The	condition	of	the	authoritarian	state	is	
one	of	diverse	social	relations	that	are	partially	subjected	to	the	domination	of	
capital	which	poses	a	major	political	–strategic	question	about	capitalist	
transformation	(in	mainstream	social	science	‘development).	It	is	this	condition	that	
generates	systemically	not	contingently	–	states	that	aim	to	use	force	and	fiat	to	
support	capitalist	classes	and	reorder	complex	social	relations	in	the	image	of	the	
market.		
But,	the	socio-economic	doctrine	of	neoliberalism	is	one	means	to	this	aspirational	
end.	There	is	no	perfect	comity	between	authoritarianism	and	neoliberalism.	Indeed,	
																																																						
1 For the purposes of analytical transparency, I should note that Thomas writes within a broadly Marxist 
framework, but Mouzelis a more pluralized and Weberian fashion. This is a conflation of the two for my own 
purposes. 
in	Mouzelis	and	Thomas,	the	authoritarianism	of	the	(semi)	periphery	is	distinctly	
dirigiste	in	ways	that	would	be	anathema	to	any	self-respecting	neoliberal.	
Nevertheless,	it	remains	the	case	that	a	fundamental	legitimacy	claim	asserted	by	
advocates	of	neoliberalism	is	its	ability	to	generate	capitalist	transformation.	Thus,	
we	define	authoritarian	neoliberalism	as	a	‘subspecies’	of	authoritarianism,	
distinguished	by	a	bundle	of	practices	and	institutions	that	construct	states	that	use	
bureaucracy	and	coercion	to	construct,	enforce	and	discipline	societies	into	
marketised	forms	in	the	faith	that,	by	doing	so,	competition	and	entrepreneurship	
will	generate	capitalist	transformation.	
This	definition	orients	an	analysis	of	authoritarian	neoliberalism	in	Africa	in	a	certain	
direction.	It	asks	questions	about	the	wherewithal	of	authoritarian	neoliberalism	to	
promote	capitalist	transformation;	and	it	remains	open	to	the	possibility	that	other	
kinds	of	authoritarianism	–	other	subspecies	–	are	also	historically	possible.		
	
Neoliberalism	in/and	Africa	
	
Yes	it	hurt,	yes	it	didn’t	work	
Neoliberalism	was,	ab	initio,	a	global	project,	not	a	‘western’	one.	The	clearest	
example	of	this	is	the	introduction	of	structural	adjustment	programmes	(SAPs)	in	
Africa	from	1979	onwards	(van	de	Walle	2001:	215).	SAPs	were	credit	packages	
designed	by	the	World	bank	and	International	Monetary	Fund,	disbursed	to	debt-
distressed	African	countries	and	conditioned	on	the	adoption	of	a	set	of	policies	
which	had	as	their	overarching	aim	the	neoliberalisation	of	development	strategy.	
Policy	changes	included	central	bank	independence,	the	removal	of	exchange	rate	
controls,	the	introduction	of	technologies	to	promote	fiscal	discipline	and	the	
reduction	of	budget	deficits,	the	removal	of	quotas	and	lowering	of	tariffs	on	
international	trade,	the	opening	up	of	economies	to	foreign	direct	investment,	the	
removal	of	price	controls,	the	removal	of	state-owned	trading	agencies,	and	the	
privatisation	of	state-owned	enterprises.		
This	is	not	the	place	to	recall	the	misfortunes	of	structural	adjustment	in	Africa.	
There	is	a	very	large	literature	that	does	this.
2
	But,	the	fact	that	over	200	SAPs	were	
(in	some	degree)	implemented	in	Africa	during	the	1980s	and	hundreds	more	
agreements	with	‘social’	and	‘poverty	reduction’	components	followed	in	the	1990s	
shows	very	clearly	how	Africa	was	at	the	forefront	of	the	neoliberal	project	from	the	
latter’s	very	origins.	The	first	neoliberal	crises	occurred	in	Africa	as	currencies	went	
into	freefall,	low	rates	of	growth	dipped	further,	commodity	price	spikes	scoured	
real	disposable	income	levels,	and	more	generally	people’s	livelihoods	became	even	
less	stable	(Mkandawire	&	Olukoshi	1995).		
Food	riots	generated	violent	police	responses	(Lawrence	1986;	Walton	and	Seddon	
1994),	drastic	policy	measures	were	imposed	by	increasingly	centralised	cabals	
focused	on	the	Ministry	of	Finance	and/or	the	Presidency,	new	or	revived	forms	of	
struggle	over	new	opportunities	for	enrichment	by	factionalised	elites	rendered	
																																																						
2 For example Campbell & Loxley (1989); Mohan et al. (2000); SAPRIN (2004). 
governance	partial,	incoherent,	violent,	and	unpredictable.	Accountability	of	the	
government	to	citizens	was	constantly	undermined	by	accountability	of	the	
government	to	the	World	Bank,	IMF,	and	aligned	bilateral	donors.	Formal	
constitutional	and	legal	measures	to	introduce	multi-party	politics	made	little	
difference	to	these	substantively	authoritarian	practices,	a	condition	described	by	
Mkandawire	as	choiceless	democracy	(Mkandawire	1999).		
In	a	nutshell,	for	Africa,	neoliberalism	has	largely	been	realised	through	centralised	
and	undemocratic	state	practices	that	resemble	authoritarianism.	Not	only	did	it	
generate	massive	amounts	of	social	harm	and	instability,	it	also	generated	at	best	
weak	responses	in	terms	of	economic	recovery,	reduced	debt,	or	a	recovered	inflow	
of	foreign	direct	investment	(Bond	2006;	Bush	2004).	
	
Welcome	to	the	desert	of	the	neoliberal	real	
Reem	Koolhass	asserted	that	‘Lagos	isn’t	catching	up	with	the	world,	the	world	is	
catching	up	with	Lagos.’	This	stylised	provocation	has	some	insight	that	we	can	bring	
to	bear	on	our	interest	in	the	interplay	of	neoliberalism	and	authoritarianism.	It	
suggests	that	Africa’s	especially	intense	and	protracted	subjection	to	the	neoliberal	
project	offers	possible	meanings	to	the	fortunes	of	the	project	in	other	places.	We	
can	identify	three	cardinal	examples	of	this.	
1.	The	neoliberal	project	is	intrinsically	crisis-ridden	(Harvey	2007).	Indeed,	the	
notion	of	‘crisis’	is	something	of	a	misnomer	for	what	are	often	more	akin	to	
permanent	and	severe	instabilities.	Neoliberalism	is	crisis.	The	currency	crashes,	
recessions,	turbulent	governance,	and	civil	instability	that	visited	African	countries	
throughout	the	1980s	are	examples	of	phenomena	that	might	now	properly	be	
understood	as	global	and	immanent	to	the	neoliberal	project.	Analogous	neoliberal	
crises	have	taken	place	in	large	Latin	American	economies	in	the	mid	1980s,	Russia	
and	the	former	Soviet	Union	in	the	late	1980s,	Southeast	Asian	countries	in	1997,	
Latin	American	countries	(again)	in	the	early	2000s,	in	the	US	in	2001	(dot	com),	and	
of	course	pretty	much	everywhere	since	2007.
3
	No	sensible	economist	is	arguing	
that	the	causes	and	conditions	of	the	2008	crisis	have	been	resolved.	Crisis	and	
austerity	are	a	way	of	life	(Evans	and	McBride	2017).	
The	specifics	of	these	crises	are	hardly	all	the	same	but	they	are	underpinned	by	
laissez-faire	macroeconomics,	the	rising	power	of	finance	capital,	global	
deregulation.	The	neoliberal	project	has	bequeathed	the	world	an	era	of	uneven	and	
combined	permanent	crisis	management	(McNally	2009).	It	is	no	exaggeration	to	say	
that	the	neoliberal	project	generates	a	systemic	intensification	of	economic	crisis	in	
order	to	survive	those	crises	and	in	the	process	create	the	possibility	of	more	
forceful	realisations	of	its	worldview	(Crouch	2011;	Mirovski	2013).	
2.	The	implementation	of	neoliberalism	involves	impositions	and	coercions	by	the	
state.	These	vary	widely	in	form	and	intensity	but	the	impositional	and	coercive	
reflex	is	immanent	to	the	neoliberal	project,	not	incidental	or	momentary	trait.	It	
might	involve	the	removal	of	policies	form	public	accountability,	the	creation	of	
																																																						
3 I am starting in 2007 because this is when sudden spikes in food prices generates extreme urban livelihood stress 
amongst the poor throughout the world. 
neoliberal	cabals	(sometimes	labelled	as	‘champions’	and	‘change	agents’	in	
neoliberal	Doublespeak)	to	propound	reforms,	the	deployment	of	the	police	to	
enforce	policies	that	generate	social	protest,	the	recourse	to	global	regulatory	
change	in	order	to	present	policies	as	inevitable	fate	rather	than	political	decision,	
and	the	creation	of	‘shadow	elites’	who	straddle	think-tanks,	universities,	private	
capital	and	governments	to	shore	up	the	power	of	the	neoliberal	project.	And	it	
might	involve	bare	dispossession	(Harvey	2004).	
In	the	1980s,	issuing	out	of	the	general	anti-statism	which	was	galvanised	by	the	
‘Berg	Report’	(World	Bank	1981),	structurally	adjusting	African	states	underwent	a	
forcible	‘roll-back’	in	their	activities	and	material	base	(Woodehouse	2003).	The	
emaciation	of	(often	already	weak	and	unstable)	African	states	tended	to	exacerbate	
deeper	governance	crises	in	which	the	core	authority	and	institutional	coherence	of	
state	seemed	uncertain.	‘Roll	back’	generated	forms	of	governance	that	were	
evacuated	even	of	the	minimal	and	procedural	accountabilities	embedded	within	
single-party	states.	As	a	result,	subsequently,	those	who	designed	and	enforced	
neoliberalism	through	the	IFIs	steered	lending	strategies	towards	a	reconstruction	of	
the	state.	This	reconstruction	facilitated	two	things.	Firstly,	a	stronger	infrastructure	
for	the	rule	of	law:	more	censuses	and	surveys,	more	effective	tax-raising	
administration,	and	more	coherent	and	transparent	investment	and	property	law,	an	
increasingly	powerful	technocratic	mode	of	governance	(Harrison	2007).	Secondly,	a	
more	proactive	bundle	of	institutions	to	incentivise	and	enhance	private	investment	
and	entrepreneurialism:	investment	promotion	centres,	support	for	the	
development	of	information	communication	technologies	and	training	to	socialise	an	
entrepreneurial	sociability	amongst	small	and	medium	sized	enterprises,	the	
creation	of	special	economic	zones	(near	ports	or	along	corridors)	that	become	
subsidised	‘hotbeds’	for	new	investment,	and	the	development	of	myriad	public-
private	partnerships	in	which	services	are	contracted	to	private	businesses	
(Mawdlsey	2015).	Some	references	by	IFIs	and	Western	donors	of	democracy,	civil	
society,	and	participation	were	in	reality	very	much	second-order	concerns	
compared	with	the	principal	objectives	of	creating	a	Hayekian	strong	state	(Gamble	
1996)	and	a	governance	regime	to	promote	market	societies.	These	two	objectives	–	
a	leaner	and	stronger	state	purposed	with	the	social	engineering	of	a	market	society	
–	easily	resided	in	a	centralised	project	of	statebuilding,	prosecuted	by	centralised	
and	technocratic	governing	elites.	
The	neoliberal	realities	of	permanent	crisis	and	a	tendential	authoritarian	response	
by	the	state	were	Africa’s	realities	from	the	1980s	and	are	now	the	world’s	reality.	
Africa	endured	an	early	and	distinctly	intense	iteration	of	the	neoliberal	project’s	
authoritarian	statecraft.		
3.	The	neoliberal	project	is	unstable	and	expansive.	The	foundational	motivation	of	
neoliberalism’s	advocates	draws	focus	onto	fundamental	changes	in	the	state	and	
the	economy,	but	the	focus	hardly	remains	there.	As	a	form	of	social	engineering,	it	
might	be	that	neoliberalism	projects	itself	through	instruments	such	as	education	
(Brown	2015),	training	and	the	promotion	of	human	capital	and	resilience	(Joseph	
2013),	techniques	of	incarceration	(Wacquant	2009),	the	provision	of	certain	kinds	of	
social	support	which	either	generate	entrepreneurial	behaviours	through	
microfinance	(Bateman	2010)	or	intensified	labour	through	“workfare”	(Perelman	
2011;	Standing	2011),	and	the	deployment	of	psychosocial	“nudges”	which	have	as	
their	target	the	cognitive	functions	of	the	brain.	There	is	no	necessary	sequencing	of	
these	facets	of	intervention:	they	are	likely	to	be	prosecuted	in	varied	and	partially-
coherent	combinations	depending	of	all	manner	of	contextual	circumstances.	What	
they	represent	is	neoliberalism’s	universal	scope	of	ambition.	As	this	totalising	
project	endures	and	expands	its	frontiers	are	extensive	(all	countries,	all	societies)	
and	intensive	(all	facets,	every	individual).		
Africa	offers	long-standing	and	striking	examples	of	this	expansiveness.	The	initial	
focus	on	currently	liberalisation,	international	trade	deregulation,	and	budgetary	
austerity	has	hardly	disappeared	but	has	been	overlain	with	what	might	be	
characterised	as	incrementally	ambitious	remits.	This	has	involved	remaking	state	
institutions,	legal	reform,	encouraging	a	certain	kind	of	civil	society,	promoting	
customer-like	attitudes	towards	public	services,	putting	more	development	practice	
into	the	hands	of	private	companies,	and	promoting	entrepreneurial	behaviour	
through	IT,	training	and	microfinance.	African	countries	that	have	endured	
neoliberal	social	engineering	for	decades	have	witnessed	a	shift	from	
macroeconomic,	through	institutional	and	social,	and	into	individual	change.	Africa	is	
the	world-regional	best	exemplar	of	neoliberalism’s	dark	rendering	of	Samuel	
Beckett’s	well-known	aphorism:	try	again,	fail	better.	
In	summary,	Africa	shows	clearly	three	constitutive	features	of	the	neoliberal	
project:	its	proclivity	for	crisis,	its	authoritarian	tendencies,	and	its	desire	to	expand	
from	core	macroeconomic	strategy	into	as	many	aspects	of	socio-political	life	as	
possible.	Not	only	does	Africa	demonstrate		these	properties	in	neoliberalism,	it	also	
provides	important	insights	as	to	how	well	the	project	fares,	not	least	because	Africa	
has	endured	an	exceptionally	long-lasting	and	virulently	implemented	version	of	
neoliberalism.		
What	Africa	shows	to	the	rest	of	the	world	is	a	state	of	affairs	in	which	protracted	
neoliberal	reform	generates	short	intervals	of	growth	usually	concentrated	on	
narrow	bases	such	as	a	export	price	change,	large	investment,	or	specific	and	largely	
isolated	sector	of	the	economy	(Bracking	2016).	This	has	generated	some	material	
improvements	in	people’s	well-being	and	a	reduction	in	extreme	poverty.	But,	it	has	
also	generated	sporadic	economic	decline;	a	continued	uncertainty	in	livelihoods	
accompanied	by	processes	of	social	differentiation;	intensified	hard	work;	a	rise	in	
fraudulent	corrupt	and	get-rich-quick	strategies	which	often	lead	to	wealth	being	
taken	out	of	country	(Ndikumana	&	Boyce	2011);	intensified	depletion	of	natural	
resources	(Woodehouse	2013);	and	a	continued	dependence	on	international	
resources	and	validation	to	sustain	basic	budgetary	and	expenditure	processes.	
Neoliberal	authoritarianism	has	also	generated	its	own	social	resistances	(Branch	&	
Mampilly	2015;	Harrison	2002).	Taking	these	patterns	together,	it	is	clearly	the	case	
that	neoliberal	authoritarianism	in	Africa	has	most	definitively	not	generated	any	
evidence	of	a	capitalist	transformation	(Bush	2007;	Rowden	2013).	
	
The	loosening	grip	of	neoliberalism	
African	countries	are	clearly	not	rapidly	forging	ahead	in	the	way	that	Latin	American	
countries	did	in	the	1960s,	Northeast	Asian	countries	did	in	the	1970s,	or	East	Asian	
countries	did	in	the	1990s.	Africa,	the	quintessential	neoliberal	region,	is	also	the	
world-region	most	starkly	defined	by	major-order	problems	of	mass	poverty	and	
faltering	economic	transformation.	The	major	sites	of	mass	poverty	reduction,	
industrialisation,	and	growth	throughout	the	era	of	neoliberalism	have	been	outside	
Africa	(Henley	2007).	They	have,	not	incidentally,	also	been	in	places	where	the	
neoliberal	project	has	been	relatively	weak	and	where	governments	have	innovated	
and	experimented	with	the	regulation	of	prices	and	capital.		
Neoliberalism	in	Africa	has	been	authoritarian	in	the	sense	that	states	have	used	
top-down,	centralised	and	coercive	measures	to	impose	the	market	society,	but	this	
has	generated	fragile	and	limited	success	and	little	evidence	of	sustained	economic	
transformation.	In	other	words,	it	has	not	only	failed	a	“neoliberal	test”	of	
generating	progress	through	market	liberalisation.	It	has	also	failed	the	
“authoritarianism	test”	within	which	centralised	and	coercive	governance	works	to	
promote	the	capitalist	development	and	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	the	ascent	
of	a	national	bourgeoisie.	Authoritarian	neoliberalism	in	Africa	has	been	in	this	sense	
an	absolute	failure,	neither	mitigated	by	a	process	of	economic	development	nor	an	
account	of	successful	developmental	governance.		
This	historical	lesson	has	fed	into	the	politics	of	some	African	countries.	Since	the	
late	1990s,	African	governments	have	sought	ways	to	reduce	the	influence	of	
external	neoliberal	advocates	and	to	explore	developmental	unorthodoxies.	Some	
scholars	cursorily	explain	this	as	largely	a	result	of	the	rise	of	China	or	the	Beijing	
Consensus,	but	it	is	surely	more	profoundly	based	in	the	constant	concern	amongst	
African	states	and	intellectuals	to	find	better	ways	to	generate	economic	
transformation	in	countries	with	mass	poverty.		
This	‘unorthodox	turn’	is	presently	nothing	more	than	a	set	of	embryonic	challenges	
to	neoliberalism.	There	is	not	a	‘model’	that	one	can	set	out	in	categorical	form.	
Furthermore,	neoliberalism	is	hardly	in	decline.	Zambia	is	a	good	example	of	how	
attempts	to	generate	economically-nationalist	state	strategies	can	falter	and	lead	to	
a	return	to	the	neoliberal	agenda	(Fraser	2009;	Larmer	2005).	But,	generally,	this	
turn	is	significant.	It	represents	a	potentially	systemic	attempt	to	move	away	from	
neoliberalism	and	to	do	so	in	a	way	that	offers	a	more	purposeful	authoritarianism	
than	that	which	realised/realises	itself	under	neoliberal	hegemony.	For	as	long	as	
neoliberalism	maintains	its	domineering	globalisation,	unorthodoxies	such	as	these	
constitute	a	kind	of	resistance,	albeit	a	normatively	complex	one.	
	
Towards	a	developmental	authoritarianism?	
We	are	using	the	term	authoritarianism	here	to	identify	a	state	form	in	which	
centralised	and	coercive	power	is	deployed	systemically	and	purposefully	to	
generate	capitalist	transformation	in	societies	in	which	a	capitalist	class	is	present	
but	hardly	dominant	or	possessing	the	wherewithal	to	accumulate	in	a	rapidly	
expanding	fashion,	drawing	in	larger	numbers	of	wage	labourers.	Neoliberal	
authoritarianism	displays	the	markings	of	centralised	and	top-down	power	but	its	
strategic	orientation	towards	a	free-market	society	renders	it	unable	to	countenance	
the	historic	necessities	of	capitalist	transformation,	a	transformation	that	can	take	
many	forms	but	will	always	involve	dirigiste	reallocations	of	property,	strong	support	
for	emerging	capitals,	the	disciplining	of	labour,	and	a	nationalist	attitude	towards	
the	global	political	economy.		
Let	us	start	by	returning	to	Zambia.	In	2011	the	Zambian	government	introduced	
subsidies	on	fertilisers	through	a	Farming	Input	Support	Programme	(Whitworth	
2015).	This	shift	was	articulated	through	a	revived	sense	of	national	development	
purpose,	explicitly	identified	as	against	the	grain	of	global	neoliberalism	(Larmer	&	
Fraser	2007).	The	use	of	price	subsidies	on	fertiliser	or	improved	seeds	against	IFI	
advice	commenced	in	Malawi	in	2005	during	a	period	of	malnutrition	and	near-
famine	and	in	response	to	political	pressures	to	move	beyond	neoliberal	agricultural	
policy	(Chinsinga	2007;	Mpesi	&	Muriaas	2012).	The	subsidies	generated	a	positive	
production	response,	although	the	modalities	of	the	subsidies	and	their	longer-term	
impact	have	been	less	clear	and	less	positive	(Chirwa	&	Dorward	2013).	The	premise	
of	these	interventions	is	that	agriculture	will	not	develop	without	state	regulatory	
intervention	in	agricultural	markets	and	specifically	that	most	sacrosanct	facet	of	the	
economy	for	neoliberals:	prices.		
One	might	add	to	the	evidence	regarding	regulatory	innovation	in	agricultural	
development.	There	has	been	a	push	back	against	foreign	investment	in	which	a	
‘national	interest’	of	one	kind	of	another	takes	political	priority.	There	are	examples	
of	this	in	relation	to	Mozambique	and	Tanzania		(Monson	2006;	Pitcher	2003).	In	
Tanzania	in	particular	since	the	presidency	of	John	Magufuli,	FDI	contracts	have	been	
renegotiated	especially	within	the	mining	sector,	although	there	remain	substantial	
reservations	concerning	the	extent	to	which	the	Tanzanian	state	is	able	to	promote	
capitalist	transformation	(Gray	2015).		
There	are	other	examples.	One	of	Kenya’s	cash	transfer	schemes	does	not	follow	
normal	donor	approaches	and	is	set	up	to	avoid	dependence	on	external	sources	
largely	as	a	result	of	concerns	with	state	legitimacy	and	social	stability	(McCord	
2010:	16).	Mali’s	decentralisation	plans	and	their	financial	management	involved	a	
rejection	of	World	Bank	programme	advice	and	a	strongly-defended	national	
programme	which	donors	eventually	bought	into	(Bergamaschi	2008).	Cameroon	
and	Senegal	re-introduced	tariffs	on	chicken	imports	to	protect	their	own	poultry	
industries	(Johnson	2011).	These	policies	are	clearly	not	in	keeping	with	the	
neoliberal	worldview.	However,	these	kinds	of	unorthodoxy	can	only	be	seen	as	
specific	and	unsystemic:	reactions	to	especially	difficult	aspects	of	neoliberal	reform.	
They	do	not	offer	a	clear	alternative	model	to	neoliberalism;	far	less	evidence	of	
resistance	of	the	kind	that	advocates	of	global	social	justice	might	wish	to	see.	But,	
this	is	not	the	whole	story.	
In	his	work	on	political	settlements,	Mushtaq	Kahn	(2010)	identifies	a	set	of	key	
diagnostic	concepts	that	relate	closely	to	the	ability	of	the	state	to	act	in	non-liberal	
ways	in	pursuit	of	capitalist	transformation.	The	core	point	is	that	the	state’s	
allocation	of	resources	will	vary	in	stability	and	efficacy	according	to	how	it	maps	
onto	the	relative	power	of	different	social	groups.	Within	this	general	terrain,	a	
strategic	meta-question	emerges	which	is:	how	to	promote	transformative	growth	
within	a	set	of	social	relations	that	potentially	destabilise	the	power	of	the	elite	
group/coalition	that	controls	government?	This	is	the	growth-stability	trade-off.	It	
relates	closely	to	the	strategic	pressure	that	generates	authoritarian	governance	in	
African	economies	and	it	offers	an	articulated	analytical	framework	through	which	to	
evaluate	the	emergence	on	unorthodox	development	policies.	
In	an	African	context,	this	framing	has	been	used	to	identify	in	some	states	a	
‘developmental	patrimonialism’	in	which	the	opaque	and	strategic	allocation	of	
rights	to	accumulate	are	conditioned	on	the	achievement	of	medium-term	
performance	goals	(Kelsall	2013;	Whitfield	et	al.	2015).	In	essence,	the	allocation	of	
credit,	subsidy,	protection,	or	a	more	general	political	support	is	actioned	in	the	
expectation	that	the	recipients	–	part	client	and	part	private	business	–	will	innovate,	
invest,	access	new	markets,	or	increase	output.	Ethiopia	(Gagliardone	2015;	LeFort	
2012;	Oqubay	2015;	Vaughan	&	Gebremichael	2011)	and	Rwanda	(Booth	&	Golooba-
Mutebi	2012)	are	key	examples	of	this,	although	one	can	also	identify	less	clear	
versions	of	this	in	Angola	(Croese	2016;	Wolf	2017),	Nigeria	(Ovadia	2016)	and	
Ghana	(Chalfin	2010).	Another	broader	example	is	Uganda’s	National	Development	
Plan	(Hickey	2013).	
These	are	not	randomly-chosen	country	cases	from	the	region.	In	each	of	these	
cases,	some	structural	change	has	taken	place	and	it	has	done	so	in	part	as	a	result	
of	strategic	and	authoritative	state	action.	What	matters	most	within	the	political	
dynamics	of	these	policies	is	the	extent	to	which	the	rights	to	accumulate	allocated	
or	confirmed	by	the	state	generate	strong	investment	and	growth	responses	from	
capital,	and	this	is	centrally	dependent	on	the	incentive	structures	integrated	into	
the	patrimonial	relationship.	In	Rwanda,	Ethiopia,	and	Uganda,	these	practices	have	
been	integrated	into	a	strong	politics	of	security	and	national	interest;	in	Nigeria,	
Ghana,	and	Angola	one	finds	a	politics	of	resource	nationalism,	although	it	would	be	
a	stretch	to	characterise	this	politics	as	anything	more	than	emergent.		
Let	us	take	one	country	case	in	a	little	more	detail.	Rwanda	has	negotiated	an	
uneasily	positive	relation	with	the	IFIs	in	which	it	both	cleaves	to	core	neoliberal	
macroeconomic	directives	and	maintains	a	strong	sense	of	national	interest	and	a	
willingness	to	deploy	other	development	strategies.	The	Rwandan	government	
seems	more	akin	to	developmental	rather	than	neoliberal	authoritarianism	in	which	
development	is	itself	a	means	to	consolidate	state	power	(Harrison	2017,	Mann	&	
Berry	2016).	Most	centrally,	the	government	has	constructed	a	complex	and	opaque	
network	of	both	political	support	and	discipline	in	connection	with	a	set	of	
diversified	companies.	This	pattern	of	ownership	is	defined	by	ultimate	ruling	party	
control	but	legally	private	ownership	and	management.	These	companies	are	
politically	tasked	with	generating	investment	in	new	areas,	exporting,	and	finding	
ways	to	grow	rapidly	(Booth	&	Golooba-Mutebi	2012).	In	agriculture,	the	
government	has	maintained	subsidies	on	fertilisers	and	seeds	at	considerable	cost	
and	in	the	face	of	the	anxieties	of	donors.	It	has	done	this	as	part	of	a	concerted	
project	to	improve	the	productivity	of	smallholder	agriculture,	a	project	that	has	also	
involved	broader	and	deeper	efforts	to	transform	productivity	(Harrison	2016).	The	
government	has	also	tried	to	find	non-neoliberal	ways	of	generating	some	financial	
depth	using	compulsory	contribution	mechanisms	(Beruhia	2016:	640).	More	
recently,	the	government	has	introduced	a	Made	in	Rwanda	strategy	which	has	
involved	a	ban	on	the	importation	of	second-hand	clothing	and	a	stronger	remit	for	
the	government	(especially	through	the	Rwanda	Development	Board)	to	push	for	
local	content	in	FDI	and	growth	in	national	manufacture.	
In	relation	to	Rwanda	and	related	cases,	it	is	important	not	to	overstretch	the	
evidence.	None	of	these	authors	are	suggesting	that	their	cases	are	definitive	
examples	of	a	systemic	alternative	to	neoliberalism	let	alone	a	wide-ranging	
developmentalism.	But,	there	is	in	each	case	both	unorthodox	strategy-making	and	a	
salient	politics	of	developmental	transformation,	even	if	buried	within	or	against	
other	discourses.	This	is	historically	significant;	these	kinds	of	formations	would	have	
been	unthinkable	in	the	late	1980s.	And,	there	is	evidence	in	all	of	these	countries	of	
sustained	economic	growth,	even	if	not	structural	transformation.		
What	these	examples	do	show	is	how	unconvincing	the	neoliberal	form	of	
authoritarianism	is	for	the	purposes	of	generating	sustained	transformative	growth.	
Even	with	such	immense	inputs	of	resource,	technical	assistance,	and	knowledge	
generation,	African	governments	which	achieve	a	modicum	of	stability	and	growth	
tend	eagerly	to	explore	ways	out	of	the	neoliberal	grip.		
	
Conclusion	
Let	us	summarise	the	argument.	We	have	used	the	concept	of	authoritarianism	
within	a	Marxist	political	economy	framework	to	identify	a	state	form	that	derives	
from	the	social	relations	of	a	capitalist	economy	in	which	the	bourgeoisie	is	weak	
and	there	is	a	prevailing	and	complex	productive	economy	based	in	small-scale	and	
low-productivity	livelihoods.	In	these	circumstances,	there	is	a	disposition	for	states	
to	seek	top-down	and	forceful	ways	to	generate	growth	and	accumulation	through	
political	support	for	capital.	This	is	what	underpins	the	more	descriptive	accounts	of	
authoritarianism	in	their	condemnation	of	undemocratic	and	centralised	modes	of	
governance.	We	have	conceptualised	neoliberalism	as	a	universal	project	to	make	
the	world	in	the	image	of	a	free-market	society,	best	understood	through	the	
practices	of	those	who	champion	the	project.	We	have	argued	that	the	African	
experience	with	neoliberalism	is	long-lasting,	highly	developed,	and	based	within	
authoritarian	co-ordinates	of	governance.	In	this	sense,	Africa	offers	us	a	worrying	
image	of	where	neoliberal	authoritarianism	leads:	systemic	social	repression,	low	
growth	and	instability,	insubstantial	performances	of	participation	and	
accountability.	If	other	regions	are	beginning	to	see	these	dynamics,	it	is	important	
to	bear	in	mind	that	they	are	long-standing	in	Africa	and	in	this	sense,	darkly,	Africa	
is	a	world-leader.	Taking	this	dour	audit	into	account,	we	moved	on	to	demonstrate	
how	the	core	purposes	of	authoritarianism	are	not	inextricably	wedded	to	a	
marketising	project	and	that	some	African	governments	and	intellectuals	are	pushing	
to	move	into	more	developmental	modes	of	development	strategy-making.		
It	would	be	erroneous	to	offer	this	evidence	as	an	embryonic	new	model.	There	has	
been	for	some	time	a	desire	–	partly	ideological	–	to	identify	an	African	
developmental	state	but	the	substance	of	these	arguments	is	usually	rather	fragile.	
What	the	evidence	does	suggest	is	that	the	authoritarian	state	form	is	more	
developmentally	effective	when	uncoupled	from	the	demonstrably	weak	
marketising	project	of	neoliberalism.	In	a	sense	authoritarian	neoliberalism	is	the	
worst	of	both	worlds	for	African	countries	which	have	small	economies,	mass	
poverty,	and	small	industrial	sectors.	It	is	all	of	the	pain	and	little	gain	beyond	the	
pockets	of	upper	middle	class	estates	and	shopping	malls.	
Making	this	argument	implies	a	rejection	of	neoliberalism	but	a	more	relativised	
approach	to	authoritarianism.	The	suggestion	is	that	authoritarian	states	might	be	
effective	development	actors	when	untied	from	neoliberal	doctrine.	This	point-of-
view	contrasts	with	the	increasing	concern	with	the	depoliticisation,	surveillance,	
securitisation,	and	centralisation	of	politics	in	Western	countries.	But,	this	contrast	is	
more	apparent	than	real.	Concerns	with	undemocratic	and	centralised	governance	in	
developed	capitalist	states	are	entirely	valid	but	they	do	also	rely	on	a	more	
descriptive	–	perhaps	even	neo-Weberian	–	categorisation.	The	social	relations	of	
production	in	Western	states	are	not	like	those	that	prevail	in	African	countries.	If	
we	are	to	derive	conceptions	of	the	state	from	the	Marxist	tradition,	there	must	be	
clear	conceptual	distinctions	between	the	kinds	of	social	formations	within	which	
the	state	resides.	In	spaces	where	the	major	political	question	beyond	basic	stability	
of	rule	is	economic	transformation,	authoritarianism	occupies	an	indeterminate	
position.	It	is	both	a	mode	of	governance	integrated	into	a	country’s	social	relations,	
a	coercive	and	centralised	set	of	practices,	and	the	best	hope	for	countries	with	mass	
poverty	to	create	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	mass	poverty	reduction.		
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